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Why	the	Postsecular	Matters:	The	Rise	of	the	Novel	and	Literary	Studies	In	the	summer	of	2016,	the	authors	of	this	essay	co-directed	a	four-week	NEH	Summer	Seminar	for	faculty,	titled	“Postsecular	Studies	and	the	Rise	of	the	English	Novel,	1719-1897.”	The	germ	of	our	seminar	was	simple.	We	are	scholars	who	work	on	eighteenth-	and	nineteenth-century	British	literature,	and	we	edit	monograph	series	in	religion,	literature,	and	postsecular	studies.	In	our	experience,	scholars	in	our	fields	have	yet	to	take	up	the	insights	of	postsecular	scholarship	in	meaningful	ways.	By	and	large,	their	stories	still	cast	the	novel	as	the	handmaid	of	secularization,	reworking	the	well-worn	plot	of	religion’s	decline	rather	than	of	its	complex	transformation	and	shape-shifting	nature	in	modernity.	We	wanted	to	lead	a	seminar	that	gave	faculty	a	chance	to	read	postsecular	scholarship	from	many	disciplines	alongside	canonical	and	lesser-well-known	novels	from	Robinson	Crusoe	to	Dracula,	tuning	our	ears	to	hear	other	possibilities	about	the	migrations	of	religion	and	secularism	in	these	narratives.	The	term	“postsecular”	continues	to	be	used	in	a	variety	of	ways	that	are	important	to	distinguish.	In	Post-Secular	Philosophy	(1998)	Philip	Blond	used	it	to	describe	a	“Radical	Orthodox”	theological	orientation.	For	Jürgen	Habermas	the	postsecular	is	a	political	designation	for	a	European	society	no	longer	homogenously	secular	and	grappling	to	integrate	religious	citizens	in	the	public	sphere.	For	scholars	in	our	discipline,	it	is	often	a	literary-historical	term	borrowed	from	John	McClure’s	Partial	Faiths:	Postsecular	Fiction	in	
the	Age	of	Pynchon	and	Morrison	(2007),	identifying	select	post-WWII	literature	more	occupied	with	faith	and	spirituality	than	the	modernist	fiction	that	preceded	it.	In	framing	our	seminar,	we	used	the	term	“postsecular”	primarily	in	a	fourth	sense,	as	shorthand	for	
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multiform	scholarship	growing	out	of	two	decades	of	the	“religious	turn”	in	the	humanities	in	general:	what	we	like	to	think	of	as	the	religious	turn’s	coming	of	age.		We	locate	postsecular	studies’	center	of	gravity	in	a	critical	perspective	towards	secularism	and	the	secularization	thesis.	Since	the	mid-twentieth	century,	sociology’s	secularization	thesis	has	been	the	dominant	paradigm	for	understanding	religion	in	modernity,	asserting	that	religion’s	social	significance	declines	as	its	roles	diminish	due	to	modern	social	differentiation	(institutions),	societalization	(the	decline	in	local	orientation),	and	rationalization.	Postsecular	studies,	in	our	view,	marks	the	coming-of-age	of	the	humanities’	“religious	turn”	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s;	it	proceeds	from	the	wealth	of	recent	historical	scholarship	that	challenges	the	predictive	and	explanatory	force	of	the	secularization	thesis,	as	well	as	from	new	critical	interdisciplinary	work	in	sociology,	anthropology,	philosophy,	and	history	that	shows	the	division	between	the	religious	and	the	secular	to	be	permeable	and	constructed,	part	of	what	Talal	Asad	calls	an	ideology	of	secularism	in	modernity.	The	“post”	in	postsecular	does	not	mean	that	the	secular	is	somehow	finished	or	that	a	premodern	religiosity	lurks	in	the	wings,	but	that	our	humanistic	and	social	science	inquires	have	passed	through	an	unreflective	assumption	of	secularization	to	a	critical	awareness	of	its	dependency	on	a	specific	production	of	the	categories	of	the	religious	and	the	secular	in	modernity.	In	this	“post”	lies	the	great	promise	of	postsecular	studies:	it	has	new	eyes	to	see	modern	manifestations	of	faith	and	secularism	that	previous	paradigms	had	rendered	invisible,	and	it	is	developing	new	vocabularies	and	frameworks	for	raising	previously	unasked	questions	about	the	complex	connections	between	religion	and	secularism	in	modernity.	
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For	both	of	us,	the	postsecular	is	a	term	at	once	imperfect	and	useful.	Imperfect,	because	of	the	different	meanings	we	attach	to	the	word	and	also	the	scholarly	irritation	that	frequently	accompanies	the	overused	“post.”	The	term	was	flagged	by	some	of	the	supportive	reviewers	and	NEH	staff	who	funded	our	seminar:	enthusiastic	about	its	content,	they	worried	that	reference	to	the	postsecular	might	alienate	certain	constituents.	In	the	end,	we	were	allowed	to	keep	the	title	on	our	website,	while	the	NEH	publicized	the	program	as	“Religion,	Secularism,	and	the	Rise	of	the	English	Novel,	1719-1897.”	Although	the	compromise	seemed	reasonable,	we	had	sought	to	retain	the	term	postsecular	because	we	felt	it	could	do	useful	work	for	our	discipline	and	the	humanities	as	a	whole,	namely,	mainstreaming	the	major	insights	of	the	religious	turn	described	in	the	previous	paragraph,	overcoming	the	ghettoization	of	religiously-related	scholarship,	and	catalyzing	a	sea	change	in	the	discipline	not	unlike	the	one	worked	by	feminism	and	the	New	Historicism	in	previous	decades.	Put	another	way,	we	thought,	and	still	think,	that	foregrounding	the	term	postsecular	enables	a	critical	perspective	on	secularism	and	an	awareness	of	the	persistence	and	transformation	of	religion	in	modernity.	This	can	help	scholars	working	on	religion	move	beyond	the	seemingly	endless	need	for	basic	refutations	of	the	secularization	thesis	and	onward	to	conversations	that	can	help	humanists	of	many	stripes	better	understand	and	speak	to	complex	iterations	of	religion,	spirituality,	and	secularism	at	work	in	the	literatures	and	cultures	we	study.		In	the	discussion	that	follows,	we	explain	why	we	think	the	postsecular	matters,	for	literary	studies	in	general	and	for	our	stories	of	the	novel	in	particular.	As	we	do	so,	we	draw	heavily	on	our	experience	of	the	seminar:	our	preparations	for	it,	the	astute	and	generous	contributions	of	the	participants,	the	gracious	wisdom	of	our	four	guest	speakers,	
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the	points	emerging	from	the	large	body	of	transformational	material	we	read,	and	the	intellectual	life	of	our	group	over	four	weeks	in	Iowa.	The	last	of	these	is	probably	the	most	difficult	experience	to	convey	here,	but	the	importance	of	communal	activity	for	postsecular	studies	is	something	that	we	want	to	insist	on	and	will	return	to	later	in	this	essay.		One	reason	we	see	the	postsecular	as	so	potentially	generative	for	literary	studies	is	its	capacity	to	prompt	a	shift,	change,	expansion,	and	re-arrangement	of	what	we	read.	The	belief	that	the	rise	of	the	novel	in	England	marks	the	arrival	of	the	secular	is	so	common,	so	pervasive,	and	so	widespread,	that	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	other	ways	of	conceiving	the	form.	There	have,	of	course,	been	multiple	attempts	to	narrate	the	rise	of	the	novel	differently	than	Ian	Watt	did	in	his	1957	book,	but	in	nearly	every	instance,	the	subsequent	accounts	have	found	no	more	room	for	religion.1	Our	interest	in	the	postsecular	is	not,	to	be	clear,	an	attempt	to	replace	one	monolithic	idea	(the	secular)	with	another	(the	religious),	but	rather	to	acknowledge	and	open	up	the	creative	space	for	thinking	that	emerges	when	difficult	ideas	and	disciplinary	modes	of	thought	are	allowed	to	cross-pollinate.	Postsecularism’s	proclivity	for	interdisciplinary	reading	is	not	only	generative,	then,	but	necessary,	too.	Once	we	recognize	that	the	relation	between	the	secular	and	the	religious—most	often	a	clearly	separated	hierarchy—helps	configure	the	habits	and	practices	of	literary	criticism	as	a	discipline,	we	can	see	why	we	need	to	read	across	established	frameworks	of	knowledge.	The	interdisciplinary	grounds	of	the	secularization	thesis	and	of	the	thinkers	who	challenge	and	revise	it	mean	we	read	sociology,	anthropology,	philosophy,	and	history,	to	understand	their	critiques	and	grasp	how	they	might	translate	into,	resonate	with,	or	inspire	related	reconsiderations	in	our	field.	
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Enthusiasm	for	interdisciplinary	reading	is	not	new,	and	we	acknowledge	the	myriad	of	other	contexts	and	arguments	put	forward	over	the	years	in	favor	of	reading	across	and	between	disciplines.	And	we	acknowledge	too	that,	as	others	have	pointed	out,	interdisciplinary	reading	brings	with	it	substantial	practical	difficulties.	Being	perpetually	confronted	by	different	assumptions	and	frames	of	reference	can	be	discomforting,	and	we	sympathize	with	those	moments	in	which	participants	in	the	seminar	voiced	a	level	of	disquiet	with	a	particular	piece	of	reading.	Why	does	the	historian	need	so	many	examples?	Why	does	the	theologian	seem	so	concerned	with	an	apparently	minor	point	of	doctrine?	Why	does	the	sociologist	rush	to	quantify	and	chart	categories	of	thought?	Why	does	analytic	philosophy	seem	so	resistant	to	the	ambiguity	of	the	literary	text?	We	appreciate	the	danger	of	simplification	that	these	characterizations	connote,	and	accept	that	the	best	scholarship,	in	multiple	disciplines,	has	long	shown	at	least	some	awareness	of	reading	outside	one’s	immediate	sphere	of	knowledge.	But	postsecular	thinking	seems	to	encourage	a	greater	level	of	interdisciplinarity	than	is	common	to	many	areas	of	literary	studies,	at	least	when	it	comes	to	the	rise	of	the	novel.	This	has	been	our	impression	as	we	listened	to	participants	(and	other	colleagues	who	looked	at	our	reading	list)	comment	on	how	different	so	much	of	our	syllabus	was	from	the	sort	of	reading	typically	done	in	the	discipline.	Their	remarks	on	this	score	led	to	internal	reflection,	from	both	of	us,	about	how	and	why	our	thinking	on	the	relation	between	the	religious	and	secular	has	drawn	so	heavily	on	material	from	outside	literary	studies.	Charles	Taylor’s	A	Secular	Age	was	an	important	text	for	us	during	the	seminar,	and	we	benefited	from	the	help	of	one	of	our	guest	speakers,	Colin	Jager,	in	helping	us	attend	to	the	rhetorical	forms	in	Taylor’s	work.	Thematically	and	formally,	A	Secular	Age	epitomizes	
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the	interdisciplinary	promiscuity	we	associate	with	the	postsecular.	Perhaps	this	is	unsurprising	given	Taylor’s	focus	on	narrative—which	he	insists	“is	not	an	optional	extra”—and	his	desire	to	relay	many	of	its	different	strands:	“The	story	of	what	happened	in	the	secularization	of	Western	Christendom	is	so	broad,	and	so	multi-faceted,	that	one	could	write	several	books	this	length	and	still	not	do	justice	to	it.”2	For	some	of	Taylor’s	detractors,	the	interdisciplinary	breadth	of	his	work	is	a	problem,	and	it	is	not	uncommon	to	hear	even	those	who	are	sympathetic	to	Taylor’s	project	joining	the	chorus	of	complaints	about	a	lack	of	disciplinary	or	historical	nuance.	There	is	a	related	concern,	articulated	more	than	once	during	our	seminar	discussions,	that	his	commitment	to	narrative	might	prove	both	limiting	and	totalizing.	But	while	we	recognize	the	need	for	incredulity	towards	any	meta-narrative	with	an	omniscient	ambition,	narrative	does	not	have	to	be	understood	in	this	manner.	On	our	reading,	the	form	narrative	takes	in	the	novel—certainly	in	the	western	tradition	but	also	elsewhere,	across	time,	place,	and	subgenre—can	and	frequently	does	model	a	more	open-ended	mode	of	conversation,	with	multiple	characters,	plot	threads,	and	readers	creating	space	for	different	interpretations.	We	wish	to	advance	a	similar	claim	for	Taylor’s	work.	For	all	the	gaps	and	weaknesses	and	biases	of	A	Secular	
Age,	the	story	it	tells	about	the	relationship	between	religion	and	the	secular	is	one	that	has	prompted	and	accommodated	scholarly	responses	from	a	huge	array	of	disciplines.	Taylor	is	not	alone	in	wanting	to	tell	a	more	complex	story	about	religion	and	the	secular.	Another	formative	text	for	our	seminar,	as	for	our	postsecular	sensibility	more	broadly,	was	Jacques	Derrida’s	essay,	“Faith	and	Knowledge:	The	Two	Sources	of	‘Religion’	at	the	Limits	of	Reason	Alone.”	Although	Derrida’s	methodological	starting	point	is	significantly	different	than	Taylor’s,	the	two	scholars	share	a	desire	to	trace	the	involved	
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historical	and	textual	threads	between	faith	and	knowledge	and	to	query	the	extent	of	their	separation.	In	pondering	this	relation,	Derrida	distinguishes	between	two	kinds	of	faith	in	modernity.	The	first	is	a	Kantian,	rationalizing	one,	which	is	always	tempted	to	cash	out	faith	in	terms	of	knowledge	and	which,	by	virtue	of	this	internal	contradiction,	is	“bound”	to	reason	“by	the	band	of	their	opposition.”3	The	second	sort	of	faith,	Derrida	writes,	is	aligned	with	prayer	and	sacrifice	rather	than	philosophy.	It	resists	the	comforts	of	abstraction,	mastery,	and	the	mechanisms	of	the	law,	passing	through	them	without	stopping	at	mirages	of	certainty,	on	towards	what	he	calls	the	“desert	in	the	desert,”	where	the	aporias	of	law	and	knowledge	appear,	and	where	belief	and	the	experience	of	the	sacredness	of	the	other	might	take	place.4	In	other	words,	the	uncertainty	of	the	desert	in	the	desert	allows	for	the	possibility	of	faith	that	remains	faith	and	is	not	subsumed	into	knowledge.	Alterity,	freedom,	and	responsibility	are	made	possible	by	faith’s	uncertainties	and	are,	for	Derrida,	since	his	earliest	works,	rooted	in	the	nature	of	language.	Building	on	Saussure’s	notion	of	the	differential	nature	of	the	sign,	Derrida’s	1968	essay	“Différance”	shows	that	thought	and	our	perception	of	reality	are	governed	by	the	same	structure:	the	work	of	différance	that	produces	presence	as	an	effect	of	temporal	and	spatial	displacement	which	leaves	a	perpetual	trace	of	alterity	on	each	idea	and	concept.	This	does	not	mean	that	there	is	no	knowledge	or	meaning,	but	that	there	is	no	knowledge	or	meaning	in	isolation.	Knowledge,	like	language,	is	relational,	based	in	constructive,	interpretive	acts	of	belief.		Re-reading	“Différance”	today,	we	can	see	why,	thirty	years	later,	Derrida	was	still	writing	in	“Faith	and	Knowledge”	about	“the	act	of	faith	in	the	appeal	to	faith	that	inhabits	every	act	of	language	and	every	address	to	the	other.”5	Faith,	like	relationality,	is	for	Derrida	inherent	in	the	linguistic	condition.	
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Overturning	binaries	is	not	the	same	as	claiming	that	all	perspectives	are	the	same,	however,	and	we	join	Derrida	and	Taylor	in	wrestling	with	the	difficulty	of	writing	and	talking	in	a	way	that	accommodates	perspectives	oriented	differently	towards	faith	and	knowledge.	One	of	our	participants	prompted	us	to	think	about	the	importance	of	table	hospitality	in	Derrida’s	explorations,	and	the	intuition	proved	fruitful	for	our	seminar.	The	Jewish	and	Christian	contexts	of	this	conceit—a	shared	insistence	that	offering	hospitality	to	a	stranger,	like	Abraham	with	the	angels,	is	the	paradigmatic	moment	of	openness	to	the	other,	both	human	and	divine—lead	us	to	understanding	why	the	postsecular,	more	adeptly	than	narrower,	secular	constructions,	encourages	the	interdisciplinary	reading	that	we	find	so	helpful	for	our	thinking	about	the	novel.	Across	our	academic	careers	we	have	experienced	some	secular	scholarly	conversations	to	be	as	inhospitable	to	religious	interlocutors	as	religious	conversations	can	be	to	secular	and	skeptical	voices,	and	so	it	is	no	accident	that	we	imagine	and	experience	the	postsecular	as	uniquely	concerned	with	hosting	long,	invested	conversations	among	speakers	that	have	yet	to	regularly	share	a	table	together.	Judaism	and	Christianity	may	not	be	unique	in	helping	us	to	set	this	table:	Amanda	Anderson	argues	for	the	cosmopolitan	ambition	of	secular	modernity,	and	Habermas	draws	on	a	related	commitment	to	Enlightenment	values	when	speaking	of	postsecular	Europe	as	a	context	in	which	secular	citizens	come	to	recognize	the	resources	and	intuitions	religious	citizens	can	offer	to	deal	with	society’s	most	contentious	divisions.	Nevertheless,	the	long-standing	commitment	of	the	three	Abrahamic	religions	to	hosting	the	other	is	a	key	reason	why	the	postsecular	enables	more	diverse	conversations	in	literary	study,	providing	deep,	fertile	soil	in	which	a	richer,	more	biodiverse	interdisciplinarity	can	flourish.	
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It	seems	to	us	that	in	the	secular	contexts	in	which	we	work,	postsecular	studies	specifically	opens	up	the	reading	of	religious	and	theological	texts,	as	well	as	religious	ways	of	reading,	by	which	we	mean	reading	marked	by	one	or	more	aspects	of	a	faith	tradition—e.g.	its	language,	rituals,	or	priorities.	Even	if	we	consider	literary	studies	a	secularized	sort	of	religious	reading,	as	many	have	done,	these	explicitly	religious	reading	practices	and	sensibilities	are,	as	Michael	Warner	points	out	in	“Uncritical	Reading,”		often	neglected	in	literary	studies.	Yet	they	overlap	a	great	deal	with	the	concerns	of	literary	scholars.	In	seeking	to	resurrect	the	reading	of	religion—that	is,	reading	with	a	greater	openness	to	theological	vocabulary	and	grammar—we	are	aware	that	not	everyone	will	share	our	enthusiasm.	Some	of	our	peers	remain	reluctant	to	talk	about	religion	in	literary	studies,	seemingly	shy	of	doing	anything	to	encourage	a	dogma	they	consider	to	be	intellectually	unyielding	and	closed	to	new	ideas.	There	is	historical	evidence,	of	course,	to	support	this	nervousness,	and	we	acknowledge	those	disturbing	instances	where	the	language	of	closed	thinking	about	faith	has	given	rise	to	violence.	But	the	same	charge	can	be	brought	against	any	other	discourse	or	body	of	thought,	not	least	political	secularism	in	the	twentieth	century.	The	signature	movement	of	secularist	thinking	since	the	early	modern	wars	of	religion	has	been	to	equate	violence	with	religious	violence,	and	thus	to	render	secularist	violence	unmarked	and	invisible,	and	therefore	unchecked.	Moreover,	we	can	think	of	numerous	counter-examples,	where	believers	from	across	the	religious	spectrum	have	privileged	freedom	and	found	in	their	beliefs	a	source	for	positive	social	transformation	and	acts	of	radical	hospitality.		Part	of	the	reason	why	the	interpretative	work	undertaken	by	those	who	identify	as	believers	can	result	in	such	different	outcomes	is	that	the	life	of	faith,	individually	and	
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communally,	is	inevitably	entangled	with	the	politics	of	power	and	the	various	forms	of	injustice	and	wrongdoing	that	mar	all	of	our	attempts	to	live	in	the	world.	This	entanglement,	which	can	be	thought	about	as	sin	but	is	perhaps	better	understood	as	the	“fortunate”	fall	described	in	Paradise	Lost,	a	fall	into	brokenness	that	nonetheless	sets	out	for	healing	in	hope,	is	not	specific	to	religious	believers:	it	is	part	of	what	it	means	to	be	human	and	a	reason	why	theological	language,	like	all	other	human	knowledge,	needs	to	come	from	a	position	of	epistemological	humility.	Contrary	to	what	many	people	think,	the	work	of	religion,	at	least	of	the	Christian	tradition	with	which	we	are	most	familiar,	is	to	explore	faith	in	all	its	worldly	entanglements	rather	than	always	seeking	to	extricate	itself	from	those	entanglements.	What	we	value	about	the	postsecular,	then,	is	its	insistence	on	thinking	about	religion	alongside	and	within	the	secular:	rather	than	seeking	or	excluding	a	reified	and	narrow	account	of	transcendence,	the	postsecular	admits	the	reading	of	religious	and	theological	texts	as	part	of	the	world	that	the	modern	academy	seeks	to	understand.	This	opens	doors,	previously	locked,	to	whole	new	intellectual	worlds.		By	resisting	the	confined	space	that	secular	thought	so	often	leaves	for	religion,	postsecular	studies	invites	us	to	examine	theological	texts	and	mine	their	theoretical	possibilities.	One	of	the	examples	we	spent	time	considering	during	our	seminar	was	the	concept	of	providence,	a	theological	doctrine	that	is	frequently	impoverished	by	those	literary	histories	which	presume	that	the	emergence	of	the	novel	inaugurates	an	emphasis	on	agency	and/or	the	material	world	at	odds	with	older	notions	of	God’s	action	in	the	world.	Many	of	the	most	brilliant	and	best	known	theorists	of	the	novel—Georg	Lukács,	Ian	Watt,	Frederick	Jameson—work	with	a	constricted	understanding	of	providence,	and	George	Levine	is	hardly	alone	when	he	sees	the	Victorian	novel’s	emphasis	on	capital	
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putting	“pressure	on	the	providence	narratives	bequeathed	to	it	by	Christianity.”6	The	problem	with	such	readings	is	that	providence	is	more	subtle	and	wide-ranging	than	the	harsh	Calvinistic	determinism	that	Charles	Dickens	embodies	in	Little	Dorrit	through	the	character	of	Mrs	Clennam.	Dickens’s	novel	was	one	of	the	texts	for	our	seminar,	and	our	lively	discussion	of	it	included	a	consideration	of	providence	that	went	much	further	than	Mrs	Clennam’s	interest	in	the	determination	of	the	elect	and	the	damned.	Christian	theology	sees	providence	more	comprehensively,	from	talk	of	how	God	makes	space	for	others	in	creation	to	the	role	of	the	Holy	Spirit	and	the	transformational	work	of	God	and	God’s	people	in	society.	Equipped	with	this	extensive	grammar	of	thought,	we	see	how	the	concerns	of	an	array	of	novels	in	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries—concerns	with	the	quotidian,	with	purpose,	and	with	the	material	world,	to	take	just	a	few	examples—are	compatible	with	rather	than	antagonistic	to	readings	that	take	seriously	the	ongoing	vitality	of	religious	thought.		Recognising	this	opens	up	the	considerable	theological	complexity	and	ambiguity	in	the	ending	to	Little	Dorrit,	which	describes	Amy	and	Arthur	“[going]	quietly	down	into	the	roaring	streets,	inseparable	and	blessed;	and	as	they	passed	along	in	sunshine	and	in	shade,	the	noisy	and	the	eager,	and	the	arrogant	and	the	froward	and	the	vain,	fretted,	and	chafed,	and	made	their	usual	uproar.”7	Five	times	in	the	final	two	paragraphs	Dickens	insists	that	the	couple	“went	down,”	and	in	one	reading	this	going	down	is	just	a	simple	and	somber	descent	from	the	sacramental	space	and	time	of	their	wedding	in	the	church,	under	the	stained-glass	image	of	Christ.	But	before	they	descend,	Dickens	has	the	pair	pause	for	a	moment	on	the	steps	of	the	portico,	“looking	at	the	fresh	perspective	of	the	street	in	the	autumn	morning	sun’s	bright	rays.”8	We	might	think	of	this	pause	as	pregnant	and	
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postsecular,	creating	a	“fresh	perspective”	that	can	acknowledge	even	slanted	autumn	sunshine	as	bright,	that	understands	going	down	into	the	daily	labors	of	motherhood	and	neighborly	care	as	radically	participating	in	Christ’s	kenosis	and	enfleshing,	in	the	Holy	Spirit’s	ongoing	work	in	forming	and	giving	life	to	the	creation.	Thinking	in	this	way	gives	us	the	means	of	overcoming	a	presumed	opposition	between	divine	and	human	agency,	as	well	as	giving	us	traction	in	pushing	back	against	Levine’s	insistence	that	the	quotidian	detail	of	the	novel,	however	religious	its	contents,	stacks	its	deck	in	favor	of	the	secular.	To	deny	the	possibility	of	this	more	positive	reading	is	to	narrow	the	Christian	valences	of	the	novel	too	negatively	for	our	tastes.		Providence	is	also	a	central	theme	in	the	writing	of	George	MacDonald,	another	of	our	novelists	during	the	seminar.	Throughout	his	fiction,	the	commitment	to	God’s	mysterious	activity	in	and	through	creation	endows	all	events	with	a	divine	purpose	that	eschews	easy	answers,	registers	the	contribution	of	all	creatures,	and	remains	open	to	different	interpretations.	While	the	writings	of	an	explicitly	Christian	author	such	as	MacDonald	may	seem	an	all-too-convenient	site	for	thinking	about	postsecular	studies	in	the	novel,	we	think	the	postsecular	opens	up	multiple	interpretative	possibilities	across	the	range	of	novels	we	work	with.	This	includes	Phantastes,	which	is	hardly	a	straightforward	religious	text:	some	of	MacDonald’s	initial	readers	were	unsure	what	to	make	of	the	theological	implications	of	his	work,	and	many	of	our	participants	had	a	similar	reaction,	delighting	in	the	freshness	of	his	writing	style	but	finding	it	hard	to	make	sense	of	the	novel’s	imaginative	explorations	through	familiar	critical	lenses.	Bringing	the	conceptual	framework	of	the	postsecular	to	bear	on	MacDonald’s	fantastic	fiction	does	not	offer	easy	answers	but	it	does	prove	beneficial,	not	least	in	ensuring	that	we	do	not	frame	only	
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questions	that	isolate	the	fantastic	from	the	affairs	of	this	world.	How	does	MacDonald	use	fantasy	in	the	novel	to	reconfigure	the	relationship	between	the	religious	and	the	secular	as	it	was	conceived	in	his	day?	In	the	heyday	of	fictional	realism,	why	does	he	find	fantasy	such	an	appealing	venue	for	expressing	something	crucial	about	the	reality	of	religious	experience?		As	Novalis	observes	in	a	quotation	that	MacDonald	uses	as	an	epigraph	for	
Phantastes,	a	“fairy-story	is	like	a	vision	without	coherence.	An	ensemble	of	wonderful	things	and	events.”	Rather	than	seeking	escape	from	the	world	that	we	know,	these	“wonderful	things	and	events”	reorient	our	customary	perceptions	of	the	world	we	inhabit	and	help	us	glimpse	creation’s	eschatological	goal.	In	MacDonald’s	hands,	the	fairy-tale	and	the		fantastic	communicate	a	crucial	dimension	of	religious	experience,	perhaps	one	that	MacDonald	is	especially	concerned	to	reconfigure:	an	experience	of	openness	to	a	sometimes	inscrutable	alterity	(“a	vision	without	coherence”)	and	of	wonder,	that	is,	the	capacity	to	experience	real	“things	and	events”	as	wonders.	Religion,	or	perhaps	spiritual	experience,	in	MacDonald’s	hands,	is	a	journey,	a	sensibility	connecting	childhood,	maturity,	and	old	age,	a	process	of	learning	and	growth,	a	mode	of	engagement	with	others	and	the	world	that	seems	necessarily	to	entail	moments	of	both	authenticity	and	of	self-deception.		As	we	saw	in	our	seminar	discussion	of	Phantastes,	MacDonald’s	theology	evokes	a	variety	of	responses:	fascination	with	his	perspective	on	suffering,	confusion	and	disagreement	about	his	understanding	of	agency,	interest	in	his	view	of	the	imagination,	and	questions	about	the	gender	politics	of	his	text.	But	the	more	basic	point	we	wish	to	emphasise	here	is	that	his	use	of	the	fantastic—and	the	religious	as	reconfigured	through	the	fantastic—maps	onto	this	world	rather	than	seeking	escape	from	it.	Recognising	this	is	
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the	key	to	integrating	the	fantasy	genre	into	our	broader	accounts	of	the	novel,	dislodging	the	dominance	so	frequently	accorded	to	realism	and	helping	us	see	a	greater	plurality	of	ways	in	which	novelists	imagine	the	world.		The	postsecular	helps	us	to	hear	the	rumblings	of	religion,	secularity	and	modernity	in	more	familiar	spheres,	too,	spheres	that	are	no	less	providential	for	their	familiarity	and	which	continue	to	mediate	a	complex	understanding	of	the	interaction	between	divine	and	human	agency.	Robinson	Crusoe	was	the	first	novel	we	turned	to	during	our	seminar,	and	our	efforts	to	draw	out	its	theological	nuances	and	indebtedness	to	the	Bible	went	hand	in	hand	with	attention	to	the	last	half	century	of	economic	and	postcolonial	thinking	on	the	novel.	Whereas	Ian	Watt	sought	to	position	the	novel’s	manifest	spiritual	and	theological	content	as	a	losing	contestant	in	the	battle	with	secularity,	we	see	in	it	a	more	complex	and	fluid	relation	among	religion,	secularity,	and	modernity,	one	that	does	not	always	pit	religion	and	secularity	against	one	another.	This	is	not	to	say	that	personal	religious	belief	is	left	uncontested	in	Defoe’s	novel.	The	key	scene	for	us	on	this	head	is	the	one	in	which	Friday	poses	a	series	of	theological	questions	to	Robinson	concerning	the	problem	of	evil	and	God’s	providential	care:	“if	God	much	strong,	much	might	as	the	Devil,	why	God	no	kill	
the	Devil,	so	make	him	no	more	do	wicked?”9	This	question	brings	Robinson	up	short,	because	throughout	his	adventures	he	assumes	precisely	that	God	is	punishing	him	for	his	wickedness,	and	in	the	run-up	to	this	discussion	with	Friday,	moreover,	that	God	would	have	him	kill	the	cannibals	to	make	them	“no	more	do	wicked.”	Robinson	thus	literally	cannot	fathom	why	his	all-powerful	Christian	God	allows	the	Devil	to	exist.	But	in	the	course	of	their	dialogue,	miraculously,	and	“mighty	affectionately,”	Friday	can:	“so	you,	I,	
Devil,	all	wicked,	all	preserve,	repent,	God	pardon	all.”10	
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deep	logic	of	this	Christian	God’s	redemptive	love	to	imagine	the	apokatastasis	panton,	the	salvation	of	the	wicked	and	even	of	the	devil.	In	what	might	more	frequently	be	interpreted	as	a	flatter	moment	of	religious	indoctrination	and	colonization,	Friday	powerfully	if	unwittingly	exposes,	in	the	very	heart	of	the	novel,	the	gaping	chasm	between	Robinson’s	unexamined	assumptions	about	God	and	the	Christian	God’s	apparent	patience	with	evil,	between	God’s	actions	in	the	world	and	the	violence	Robinson	would	commit	in	God’s	name.	 Although	the	problem	of	evil	has	a	long	history	of	reflection	within	faith	communities,	in	this	case	it	falls	to	an	outsider—Friday—to	put	his	finger	on	the	difficult	question.	The	contribution	of	the	religious	outlier	is	not	a	sign	of	secularization,	however,	and	in	a	postsecular	spirit	we	might	read	the	scene	more	generously	as	one	of	mutual	hospitality	and	its	outcomes.	Friday’s	questions	form	the	basis	of	three	happy	years	of	companionship	and	conversation,	in	which	the	Savage	is	said	to	become	a	“good	Christian.”11	This	latter	development	raises	the	question	of	whether	the	same	can	be	said	of	Robinson	and	whether	he	should	be	Friday’s	spiritual	judge,	and	the	question	does	not	go	away	as	the	two	of	them	continue	to	talk	about	the	Word	of	God.	Furthermore,	the	fact	that	Friday	is	a	native	rather	than	a	European	modern	and	that	Robinson’s	(and	Defoe’s)	religious	beliefs	about	providence	are	themselves	inflected	by	modernity	make	it	clear	that	secularism	is	not	the	only	source	for	thinking	critically	about	belief.	Nor	is	it	the	case	that	Friday	reveals	how	the	outsider	can	always	see	more	clearly	what	the	believer	cannot.	Instead,	Friday’s	contribution	suggests	that	the	best	sort	of	theological	thought	always	proceeds	in	dialogue.	There	is	a	parallel	here	with	Mikhail	Bakhtin’s	account	in	The	Dialogic	
Imagination	of	the	mingling	of	voices	that	marks	the	emergence	of	the	novel	form	in	the	
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modern	world.	It	is	no	accident,	we	think,	that	Bakhtin	turned	to	Dostoevsky,	an	avowedly	Christian	novelist,	to	illustrate	his	account	of	the	novel,	and	we	share	the	perspective	of	those	contributors	to	the	collection	Bakhtin	and	Religion:	A	Feeling	for	Faith,	who,	according	to	the	editors,	see	Bakhtin	“as	deeply	immersed	within	the	tradition	of	Christian	thought.”12	Reading	Bakhtin	in	this	way	reveals	how	the	dialogic	emphasis	he	saw	in	the	emergence	of	the	eighteenth-	and	nineteenth-century	novel	is	rooted	in	the	multi-voiced	narratives	of	the	Judaeo-Christian	scriptures	as	much	as	it	is	in	the	plurality	of	modernity,	and	can	never	be	fully	divorced	from	a	religious	sense	of	sacred	or	liturgical	dialogue	with	the	other	as	an	act	of	faith.	For	all	Bakhtin’s	interest	in	the	modern	conditions	that	influence	the	form	of	the	novel,	there	is	in	his	work	a	corresponding	recognition	of	the	continuity	with	an	earlier	impulse	that	emanates	from	a	religious	view	of	language:	“The	development	of	the	novel	is	a	function	of	the	deepening	of	dialogic	essence.”13	This	amounts	to	a	very	different	history	of	the	novel	than	the	one	given	to	us	by	Frederic	Jameson,	who	sees	in	the	“already	secular	‘spiritual	autobiography’	of	Defoe”	a	form	in	which	“religious	influence	is	itself	a	mere	external	and	enabling	condition.”14	We	are	anxious	not	to	repeat	Robinson’s	colonial	mindset	by	exploring	the	formal	qualities	of	the	novel	and	declaring	the	treasures	we	find	there	to	be	the	property	of	Christianity.	Though	we	see	a	theological	history	in	the	concept	of	dialogism	that	Bakhtin	finds	in	the	novel,	it	does	not	follow	that	the	language	of	the	dialogic	belongs	only	to	those	who	see	themselves	as	part	of	a	community	of	faith.	The	dilemma	of	knowing	how	to	talk	about	religious	influences	without	closing	down	discussion	or	marginalizing	other	contributions	is	one	that	recurs	regularly	in	our	reflections	on	the	postsecular:	how	do	we	describe	new	discoveries	in	our	thinking	about	the	religious	and/or	secular	whilst	avoiding	
	 17	
triumphalism	and	the	exploitation	that	remains	such	a	problem	for	Defoe?	This	is	a	question	with	implications	that	extend	beyond	our	thinking	about	the	novel,	and	the	broader	hermeneutical	concern	is	one	that	Bruno	Latour	touches	on	in	“Why	Has	Critique	Run	out	of	Steam?”	when	he	considers	the	dominant	mode	of	reading	in	the	humanities	and	queries	whether	we	should	add	“fresh	ruins	to	fields	of	ruins”	through	our	attachment	to	critique.15		Latour	describes	critique	as	a	mode	of	intepretation	that	seeks	to	get	behind	or	beneath	appearances	and	demystify	the	ideology	of	texts.	The	risk	with	reading	in	this	way	is	that	we	presume	we	are,	in	Latour’s	words,	“always	right!	When	naïve	believers	are	clinging	forcefully	to	their	objects	…	you	can	turn	all	of	those	attachments	into	so	many	fetishes	and	humiliate	all	the	believers	by	showing	that	it	is	nothing	but	their	own	projection,	that	you,	yes	you	alone	can	see.”16		Latour’s	interrogation	of	his	own	reading	practice	is	part	of	a	hermeneutical	turn	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	postcritical.	While	alternatives	to	the	dominant	hermeneutic	practiced	in	literary	studies	have	recently	been	designated	in	all	sorts	of	ways	(including	the	“surface	reading”	proposed	by	Stephen	Best	and	Sharon	Marcus),	the	term	postcritical	insists	that	we	explore	these	options	with	ongoing	reference	to	the	practice	of	critique.17	The	key	thinker	for	us	here	is	Rita	Felski,	whose	book	The	Limits	of	Critique	(2015)	makes	it	clear	that	it	is	our	excessive	reliance	on	critique,	rather	than	critique	per	se,	that	is	the	problem:	“That	critique	has	made	certain	things	possible	is	not	in	doubt.	What	is	also	increasingly	evident,	however,	is	that	it	has	sidelined	other	intellectual,	aesthetic,	and	political	possibilites—ones	that	are	just	as	vital	to	the	flourishing	of	new	fields	of	knowledge	as	older	ones.”18	While	the	practice	of	critique	has	often	centred	on	matters	of	economics,	race,	and	gender,	those	who	are	interested	in	religion	can	easily	find	
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themselves	performing	the	same	sort	of	reading,	“as	the	critic	scans	page	or	screen	for	signs	of	failed	repression	and	demonstrates	that	a	text	is	not	in	command	of	its	own	rhetoric.”19	For	a	postsecular	scholar	of	the	novel,	the	postcritical	issues	a	call	to	read	differently	without	either	leaving	critique	behind	altogether	or	falling	into	the	trap	of	critiquing	critique	and	reinstating	the	very	mode	of	reading	we	have	just	been	complaining	about.	From	our	vantage	points,	the	postsecular	is	one	particular,	potent	version	of	the	postcritical,	and	the	postcritical	and	postsecular	are	potentially	great	allies,	especially	if	we	work	to	articulate	their	common	ground	and	differences.	The	postcritical	often	borrows	the	language	of	enchantment,	immersion,	and	suspension	of	disbelief.	While	this	might	seem	promising	for	a	postsecular	critic,	such	language	sometimes	serves	merely	to	quarantine	and	even	neutralize	the	experience	of	belief	in	a	safely	secular,	literary,	even	virtual	environment.	Such	a	recognition	can	prompt	us	to	reflect	on	the	important	differences	between	the	two	modes	of	enchantment,	and	to	consider	the	significance	of	the	extra-virtual	openness	of	religious	and	spiritual	experience,	of	what	it	means	to	suspend	one’s	disbelief	in	ways	that	are	not	only	temporary	or	provisional.			Without	such	a	conversation	with	the	postsecular,	the	postcritical	runs	the	risk	of	reinscribing	the	secular/religious	binary	that	we’ve	been	troubling	for	twenty	years	now.	While	we	greatly	admire	The	Limits	of	Critique,	sharing	many	of	its	convictions	and	finding	in	its	pages	a	considerable	amount	of	space	for	religious	reflection,	we	are	struck	by	those	moments	in	which	the	religious	language	of	Felski’s	book	is	filtered	through	a	secular	lens.	In	such	passages,	the	rhetoric	condemns	the	hermeneutics	of	suspicion	as	an	ascetical,	cultish	practice,	complete	with	its	own	creeds,	rituals,	and	modes	of	belief,	and	proclaims	
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its	own	good	news:	that	of	a	more	rational,	secular	literary	faith.	This	pattern	of	paradigm-shifting	as	a	kind	of	ritual	of	re-secularization	has	been	in	evidence	since	the	earliest	days	of	the	professional	study	of	English,	when	the	amateur’s	love	of	literature	was	cast	in	terms	of	hazy	enthusiasm	and	abandoned	in	favor	of	more	rigorous,	secular,	serious,	objective	forms	of	knowledge,	and	subsequent	shifts	tend	to	paint	the	previous	paradigm	as	excessively	naïve	and	insufficiently	concrete	or	critical.20	Looking	back	on	previous	paradigm	shifts	in	our	profession,	we	can	predict	what	both	the	postcritical	and	the	postsecular	will	turn	into,	if	they	amount	only	to	more	rituals	of	our	re-secularization:	the	next	critical	“-ism,”	eventually	overthrown	in	the	name	of	a	more	certain	secular	knowledge.	What	we	don’t	know	yet	is	what	it	would	look	like	to	remain	with	our	uncertainty,	to	refuse	to	reinscribe	the	secular/religious	divide,	and	to	say	to	ourselves	that	this	condition	of	believing	in	the	midst	of	imperfect	knowledge	is	the	human,	linguistic	condition	of	being	in	the	world,	the	condition	of	making-meaning	and	of	what	might	be	shared	in	a	deep	and	genuine	pluralism.	This,	by	our	lights,	is	a	more	promising,	rightly	postsecular	version	of	the	postcritical.	From	within	such	a	postsecular	conversation,	we	might	begin	to	glimpse	a	scholarly	culture	in	which	spiritual,	religious	experiences	of	hope,	belief,	love,	and	longing	are	not	routinely	dismissed	or	secularized.		 There	are	occasions	when	the	postcritical	shares	such	a	vantage,	as	when	Felski	questions	the	narrative	of	modernity	as	a	one-way	slide	into	disenchantment:	It	is	not	just	that	critique	has	failed	to	eradicate	the	desire	for	the	sacred	and	to	root	out	magical,	mystical,	and	mythological	thinking,	which	flourish	in	both	old	and	new	guises.	We	might	also	consider	that	critical	thinking	
	 20	
conjures	up	its	own	forms	of	enchantment;	the	faith	in	critique	is	no	different,	in	certain	respects,	from	other	forms	of	faith.	…	That	critique	has	its	sacred	texts,	rites	of	passage,	and	articles	of	faith	is	not	a	deplorable	lack	or	shameful	failing—something	to	be	corrected	by	an	industrial-strength	dose	of	yet	more	critique.	It	is	a	timely	reminder,	however,	of	the	blurred	lines	between	the	secular	and	the	sacred,	the	modern	and	the	premodern,	and	thus	of	the	limits	of	any	vision	of	critique	as	disruptive	negativity.21	Key	here	is	the	potentially	postsecular	recognition	of	the	religiousness,	or,	as	Felski	might	say,	the	enchanted	nature	of	critique	as	of	all	forms	of	meaning-making:	the	capitulation	of	critique’s	claim	to	a	monopoly	on	rationality	and	acknowledgment	of	its	imbrication	in	a	world	of	sign-	and	meaning-making	that	is	inevitably	a	place	of	interpreting	and	believing,	of	giving	and	receiving	credit,	of	sacralizing	aspects	of	human	experience.	And	yet	the	postcritical	and	postsecular	do	not	always	collapse	into	one	another	or	fully	translate	into	each	other’s	terms.	If	postcritical	thinking	seeks,	in	Felski’s	terms,	“to	strengthen	rather	than	diminish	its	object—less	in	a	spirit	of	reverence	than	in	one	of	generosity	and	unabashed	curiosity,”	as	postsecular	interlocutors	we	would	investigate	the	various	valences	of	“generosity”	and	“curiosity”	over	and	against	“reverence”	and	explore	why	reverence	is	somehow	lesser	than	the	other	two	or	incompatible	with	them.22	While	generosity,	curiosity,	and	reverence	all	seem	to	speak	to	our	sense	of	religious	selves	and	personhood,	perhaps	reverence	is	more	basically	incompatible	with	the	liberal,	autonomous	individual	implicit	in	the	postcritical,	an	individual	who,	by	the	end	of	The	
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Limits	of	Critique,	seems	unable	to	occupy	a	position	of	reverence	or	enjoy	immersive	experience	beyond	the	confines	of	a	novel	or	movie.		 Aware	of	the	limits	of	the	liberal	subject	and	impressed	by	the	capacity	of	novels	to	encourage	dialogue	across	the	stories	that	they	tell,	we	sought	models	of	exchange	in	our	seminar	that	might	work	to	similar	ends.	The	seminar	format	was	central	to	this	work,	and	we	were	grateful	to	our	participants	for	modelling	an	openness	to	other	perspectives	during	seminar	discussion	and	in	other	contexts	too.	And	we	were	thankful	for	the	input	provided	by	our	four	guest	speakers—Colin	Jager,	Misty	Anderson,	Deidre	Lynch	and	Regina	Schwartz—which	helped	to	prevent	our	discussions	from	growing	too	settled.	But	in	an	attempt	to	structure	our	seminar	in	a	way	that	would	further	extend	our	commitment	to	the	dialogic,	we	also	experimented	with	a	different	way	of	hearing	about	participants’	individual	projects.	In	the	sessions	set	aside	for	seminar	members	to	learn	about	each	other’s	individual	research	projects,	participants	were	paired	together	and	asked	to	give	a	ten-minute	introduction	to	the	other	person’s	work	that	was	both	summative	and	evaluative.	Pre-written	papers	provided	the	basis	for	seminar	members	to	prepare	these	introductions,	and	participants	supplemented	this	written	work	with	one-on-one	meetings	before	the	group	sessions;	the	assigned	pairs	read	each	other’s	project	descriptions,	met	together	face-to-face	to	talk,	ask	questions,	and	come	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	each	other’s	work	and	motivations,	and	only	then	crafted	their	presentations	of	each	other’s	projects,	followed	by	further	queries	and	suggestions.	During	the	group	sessions,	seminar	members	did	not	talk	about	their	own	their	work	until	the	Q&A	period,	which	meant	that	the	only	introduction	that	participants	had	to	an	individual’s	work	was	through	someone	else’s	words.	Shortened	versions	of	the	pre-written	papers	were	made	available	
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beforehand,	but	there	was	no	expectation	that	participants	would	read	these	ahead	of	the	session.	In	using	this	model,	our	hope	was	that	it	would	encourage	discussion.	But	the	reality	was	more	profound,	and	our	shared	dialogue	was	taken	to	higher	levels	by	everyone	being	thrown	into	a	shared	interpretative	conversation,	in	which	one’s	own	ideas	began	in	dialogue,	and	in	a	setting	where	ideas	and	persons	were	intermingled.		 Participants	consistently	singled	out	this	format	as	unique	in	their	academic	experiences,	and,	by	turns,	extremely	challenging	and	enlightening.	By	the	end	of	the	seminar,	many	participants	found	themselves	commenting	not	only	on	the	implications	of	this	mode	of	exchange	but	also	upon	other	ways	in	which	the	postsecular	approach	of	the	seminar	was	leavening	the	whole	texture	of	our	conversations.	The	postsecular	seemed	to	authorize	us	to	speak	in	meaningful	ways	about	the	“big	questions”	of	love	and	anger,	injustice	and	retribution,	communion	and	isolation;	and,	simultaneously,	it	seemed	to	lend	a	transfiguring	and	generous	spirit	to	our	conversations,	which	involved	a	wide	range	of	people,	from	those	who	identifed	as	religious	to	those	who	did	not.	Participants	reflected	so	repeatedly	on	the	liberating	goodwill	of	the	conversations	and	its	possible	relation	to	the	seminar’s	methodology	and	subject	matter	that	we’d	be	remiss	not	to	think	about	it	further.	Our	wager	is	that	participants,	ourselves	included,	from	a	real	range	of	religious	and	secular	identities	and	very	different	educational	backgrounds	and	institutions,	found	the	postsecular	framework	of	the	seminar	liberating	because	it	encouraged	us	to	see	each	other	as	persons	with	genuine	beliefs	and	commitments,	and	to	extend	compassion	for	the	epistemological	and	humane	vulnerability	of	our	condition.	While	it	might	be	tempting	to	label	this	view	as	religious,	we	could	also	describe	it	as	a	better	sort	of	secularity—a	phrase	generated	by	the	participants	and	echoed	across	the	four	weeks	as	a	primary	goal	of	
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postsecular	studies,	the	generation	of	a	more	genuinely	plural	secularity	that	assumes	rather	than	downplays	the	multiple	religious	positionalites	of	its	participants.	Whether	we	look	towards	a	better	form	of	secularity	or	of	religious	belief	or	both,	the	goal	is	to	acknowledge,	preserve,	and	cherish	the	human	condition	of	seeking,	reasoning	and	believing	in	the	face	of	uncertainty,	over	and	against	any	form	of	coercion,	religious	or	secular.		Personhood,	communion,	community,	and	conversation	remain	for	us	the	watchwords	of	postsecular	thinking—heady	ideals	with	practical	pedagogical	and	scholarly	implications,	even	when	(and	precisely	because)	they	are	never	fully	achieved.		 Articulating	the	goal	of	postsecularity	in	this	way	risks	a	departure	from	the	typical	emphasis	of	the	novel,	which,	in	the	nineteenth	century	at	least,	was	marked	by	a	commitment	to	particularity	rather	than	abstract	thought.	To	guard	against	this	departure	and	remind	ourselves	once	again	why	we	teach	novels	rather	than	works	of	professional	philosophy,	we	want	to	conclude	by	foregrounding	those	important	moments	in	the	seminar	where	different	perspectives	rubbed	against	one	another.	These	moments	were	not	as	notable	for	their	conflict	as	they	were	for	their	capacity	to	surprise.	The	differences	inherent	in	any	genuine	conversation,	whether	in	person	or	via	the	reading	of	texts,	led	to	moments	of	interruption:	unexpected,	unsettling,	revealing,	transformative,	and	sometimes	amusing.	One	of	the	most	memorable	examples	for	us	occurred	during	our	reading	of	John	Zizioulas,	an	Orthodox	Christian	theologian.	For	Zizioulas,	the	interdependent	life	of	the	triune	God	models	a	way	of	understanding	human	personhood	that	is	very	different	from	those	models	of	personhood	in	Western	thought	which	think	primarily	in	terms	of	individual	ontology.	Writing	in	Communion	and	Otherness	(2006),	Zizioulas	explains:	“Both	in	the	case	of	God	and	in	that	of	human	beings	the	identity	of	a	person	is	recognized	and	
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posited	clearly	and	unequivocally,	but	this	is	so	only	in	and	through	a	relationship,	and	not	through	an	objective	ontology	in	which	this	identity	would	be	isolated,	pointed	at	and	described	in	itself.”23	Zizioulas’s	understanding	of	personhood	is	rooted	strongly	in	the	details	of	Orthodox	theology,	and	while	some	of	us	were	happy	to	rehearse	and	pore	over	long-standing	points	of	doctrinal	elaboration,	others	were	bemused	about	the	need	for	such	extended	theological	work,	even	as	they	were	moved	by	the	beauty	of	Zizioulas’s	thought.	Common	to	all	was	an	awareness	that	although	theological	ideas	do	not	always	translate	easily	into	the	thinking	of	those	who	remain	unsure	about	such	Christian	beliefs,	they	can	nonetheless	result	in	insights	as	invigorating	as	they	are	strange.	As	one	of	our	participants	put	it,	“I	don’t	know	whether	I	should	be	assigning	this	to	all	my	students	or	getting	the	hell	away	from	it.”	His	question	is	an	important	one,	referencing	real	fears,	longings,	and	risks,	and	we	spent	some	time	talking	about	it	together.	But	even	more	important	for	us	is	the	way	that	the	comment	exemplifies	the	capacity	of	the	postsecular	to	make	for	surprised	and	surprising	bedfellows,	sustaining	the	strange	sort	of	conversations	that	we	are	used	to	reading	about	in	novels	but	less	used	to	experiencing	in	the	course	of	our	literary	scholarship.	 ________	The	happy	codas	that	we	frequently	find	in	the	nineteenth-century	novel	can	sometimes	be	read	as	unnecessary	afterthoughts.	While	there	may	be	some	truth	to	that	judgment,	what	follows	could	not	be	more	different,	as	we	finish	by	acknowleding	the	scholars	we	had	the	honor	and	joy	of	conversing	with	over	the	course	of	our	seminar.	This	article	and	our	ongoing	thinking	about	the	postsecular	would	be	impossible	without	them,	and	we	end	by	recording	our	considerable	gratitude	to:	Christine	Colón	(Wheaton	College,	IL),	Dwight	
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Codr	(University	of	Connecticut),	Sean	Dempsey	(University	of	Arkansas),	Jeffrey	Galbraith	(Wheaton	College,	IL),	Stephanie	Hershinow	(Baruch	College),	Cheri	Larsen	Hoeckley	(Westmont	College),	Joanne	Janssen	(Baker	University),	Jessica	Ling	(UC	Berkeley),	Lauren	Matz	(St.	Bonaventure	University),	Haein	Park	(Biola	University),	Ioana	Patuleanu	(Mercer	County	Community	College),	Ariana	Reilly	(Utah	Valley	University),	Kevin	Seidel	(Eastern	Mennonite	University),	Winter	Jade	Werner	(Wheaton	College,	MA),	John	Wiehl	(Case	Western	Reserve	University),	Andrew	Williams	(our	seminar	coordinator,	University	of	Iowa),	and	Mimi	Winick	(Rutgers	University).	For	brief	video	presentations	of	their	projects	and	materials	related	to	the	seminar,	see	https://uiowa.edu/postsecular-novel/	.			
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Notes																																																								1	Margaret	Anne	Doody’s	The	True	Story	of	the	Novel	might	be	seen	as	the	most	obvious	exception,	with	its	interest	in	the	feminine	spirituality	of	ancient	novels.	But	Doody’s	work	sustains	a	level	of	suspicion	towards	aspects	of	the	Christian	tradition,	from	the	declaration	that	“it	would	be	a	very	bad	thing,	and	disastrous	for	the	appreciation	of	the	Novel	as	a	form,	if	this	understanding	of	its	religious	origins	and	nature	left	us	starring	blankly	at	a	set	of	tracts”	(170)	to	the	more	implicit	ideas	informing	her	assurance	that	“[t]he	‘religion’	of	the	novels	is	related	not	to	a	set	of	rules	but	to	the	understanding	of	a	life	lived	hermeneutically,	that	is	as	something	with	meaning	for	individuals”	(171).	We	share	Doody’s	reservations	about	a	rules-based	reading	of	religion	but	we	do	not	think	that	this	has	to	exclude	the	theology	and	practice	of	Christian	believers.	
2	Taylor,	A	Secular	Age,	29.	
3	Derrida,	“Faith	and	Knowledge,”	2.	
4	Ibid.,	21,	33.	
5	Ibid.,	18.	
6	Levine,	Realism,	Ethics	and	Secularism,	213.	
7	Dickens,	Little	Dorrit,	859-60.	
8	Ibid.,	859.	
9	Defoe,	Robinson	Crusoe,	184.	
10	Ibid.,	184.	
11	Ibid.,	186.	
12	Felch	&	Contino,	Bakhtin	and	Religion,	16.	
13	Bakhtin,	The	Dialogic	Imagination,	300.	
	 27	
																																																																																																																																																																																		14	Jameson,	“The	Experiments	of	Time,”	102.	
15	Latour,	“Why	Has	Critique	Run	out	of	Steam?,”	225.	
16	Ibid.,	239.	
17	Other	alternatives	include	the	reparative	reading	of	Eve	Kosofsky	Sedgwick,	the	hermeneutics	of	love	favoured	by	Alan	Jacobs,	the	distant	reading	of	Franco	Morretti,	the	uncritical	reading	called	for	by	Michael	Warner,	and	the	descriptive	reading	proposed	by	Heather	Love.	
18	Felski,	The	Limits	of	Critique,	190.	
19	Ibid.,	65.	
20	See	Lori	Branch,“The	Rituals	of	Our	Re-Secularization:	Literature	Between	Faith	and	Knowledge.”		
21	Felski,	The	Limits	of	Critique,	134.	
22	Ibid.,	182.	
23	Zizioulas,	Communion	and	Otherness,	112.	
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